Bogusław Wolniewicz (ur. w 1927 w Toruniu) - filozof i logik. Publicysta i felietonista zwłaszcza Telewizji Trwam, Radia Maryja , Naszego Dziennika. W

Bogusław Wolniewicz (ur. w 1927 w Toruniu) - filozof i logik. Publicysta i felietonista zwłaszcza Telewizji Trwam, Radia Maryja , Naszego Dziennika. W 2005 r. startował w wyborach parlamentarnych z listy Platformy Janusza Korwin-Mikke.

Życiorys
Studiował w latach 1947-1951 na Uniwersytecie Mikołaja Kopernika. Do 1953 r. był asystentem w Katedrze Logiki UMK, a od 1956 r. wykładowcą na WSP w Gdańsku. W 1963 r. został przeniesiony do Katedry Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego z inicjatywy Adama Schaffa. Do 1998 r. był profesorem w Instytucie Filozofii UW, kiedy to odszedł na emeryturę. W latach 1956 - 1981 członek PZPR.


Nauka
Bogusław Wolniewicz specjalizuje się w filozofii religii i filozofii współczesnej. Dystansuje się od głównych nurtów filozofii XX wieku i przyjmuje tezy wielkich myślicieli, m.in.: Arystotelesa, Leibniza, Hume'a, Kanta i szczególnie Wittgensteina. Krytyczny wobec freudyzmu, fenomenologii, postmodernizmu i fundamentalizmu religijnego, a od lat 90. XX wieku także marksizmu, reprezentuje postawę analityczną i metafizyczną. Główne założenia jego myśli to aksjologiczny absolutyzm w wersji racjonalistycznej i metafizyczny pesymizm w spojrzeniu na człowieka oraz społeczeństwo.

Postanowieniem prezydenta Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego z dnia 11 listopada 1997 roku, za wybitne zasługi dla nauki polskiej, został odznaczony Krzyżem Oficerskim Orderu Odrodzenia Polski.

KRAINA PRAWNICZYCH UROJEŃ

KRAINA PRAWNICZYCH UROJEŃ
Z PROF. BOGUSŁAWEM WOLNIEWICZEM ROZMAWIA JERZY PAWLAS
– W ciągu ostatnich dziesięciu lat przestępczość wzrosła dwuipółkrotnie. Zaledwie kilkanaście procent skazanych trafia do więzienia. 40 procent gwałcicieli dostaje wyroki z zawieszeniem. Nic więc dziwnego, że większość społeczeństwa domaga się zaostrzenia kar i przywrócenia kary śmierci. Tymczasem prezydent wetuje próbę zaostrzenia odpowiedzialności karnej. Jak skomentować tę absurdalną sytuację?

– Mamy do czynienia z głębokim rozdźwiękiem między systemem prawnym państwa a świadomością prawną społeczeństwa. Nasz system prawny zaczyna funkcjonować w jakiejś rzeczywistości wirtualnej, w krainie prawniczych urojeń. Z zadziwiającym fanatyzmem forsuje się w nim coś, co można by określić jako prawniczy laksyzm – wiarę, że społeczeństwo można naprawić przez rozluźnianie rygorów prawnych. Jest to nowa postać myślenia utopijnego, które wciąż żyje, mimo krachu komunizmu.

– A jednak reprezentacja parlamentarna społeczeństwa tak właśnie postępuje, nie stanowiąc prawa w jego interesie – co jest paradoksem demokracji.

– Bo i parlament, i do pewnego stopnia również samo społeczeństwo obracają się w owej wirtualnej rzeczywistości. Gdyby było ono faktycznie tak rygorystycznie nastawione, jak na to wskazują sondaże, to pierwsze wybory zmiotłyby tych parlamentarzystów ze sceny politycznej.

– W 1997 roku przeciwko zniesieniu kary śmierci głosowało 162 posłów, w tym 37 postkomunistów – więc jednak kara główna wywołuje kontrowersje?

– Widać niektórzy posłowie zachowali jeszcze zdrowy rozsądek i słusznie uznają karę główną jako zawias, na którym jest zawieszony cały system prawa karnego. Kara główna stabilizuje ten system, nadaje mu właściwy poziom surowości. Z dużą sympatią patrzyłem na poczynania ministra Kaczyńskiego, zmierzające do zaostrzenia kodeksu karnego, ale uważam, że to niewiele da. Dopiero kara główna nadaje systemowi prawnemu właściwą powagę i siłę.

– Państwo niedostatecznie chroni obywatela, nie zapewnia mu bezpieczeństwa – jednak gwarantuje życie przestępcy. Kto jest zatem ważniejszy – kryminalista czy tak zwany zwykły obywatel?

– To, że prawo pilnie baczy, by przestępcy nie stała się krzywda, a ofiarą przejmuje się mało – stanowi część owej wirtualnej rzeczywistości, w której ono dziś żyje. Przyczyną jest z gruntu błędna filozofia prawa. Jej zwolennicy mają się za oświeconych, a społeczeństwo – za ciemne. Chcą je więc ucywilizować. Na tym polega utopia i jej arogancja. Prawnicy chcą nam urządzić lepsze życie według swoich wyobrażeń. Te poglądy są wśród nich niemal powszechne – na wydziałach prawa i w sądownictwie.

– Zarówno wzrastająca liczba, jak i brutalizacja czynów przestępczych, utwierdza przekonanie społeczeństwa o konieczności stosowania kary śmierci. Tymczasem jej zwolenników posądza się o wszystko, co najgorsze.

– Prawnicy nie liczą się z pewnym ważnym faktem metafizycznym: że zło jest dynamiczne. I to bardziej niż dobro. Prosty przykład, jeden złośliwy łobuz w klasie wystarczy, by zdezorganizować całą lekcję, a jeden poprawnie zachowujący się uczeń klasy nie zorganizuje. A nasi prawnicy wydają się być zdziwieni, że rośnie ilość i brutalność przestępstw. Prawo musi się opierać na trafnej filozofii człowieka – ma przecież regulować jego zachowania społeczne. Miłosz mówi za świętym Mateuszem, a ja tylko za nimi powtarzam – są ludzie z dobrego nasienia i ze złego nasienia. Tymczasem prawnicy wierzą, że wszyscy są z dobrego, a tylko warunki czasem nie sprzyjają jego kiełkowaniu.

– To wizja deterministyczna, wykluczająca przyjętą obecnie moralność sytuacyjną?

– Jestem przekonany, tak jak Schopenhauer, że charakter jest wrodzony i nic go nie zmieni. Nie wiadomo jednak z góry, kto jest z jakiego nasienia. O każdym zatem przyjmujemy, że jest z dobrego, dopóki swoim czynem nie pokaże, że jest inaczej. A wtedy koniec.

– To nie można wychowywać, resocjalizować?

– Wychowuje się dzieci w domu rodzinnym, trochę w szkole. Tak zwana resocjalizacja więzienna jest kompletną fikcją. Bardzo trafnie ujął kiedyś sprawę minister Kaczyński, stwierdzając, że jedyną funkcją resocjalizacyjną więzienia jest to, żeby ten, kto już raz tam był, nigdy nie chciał tam wrócić.

– Czy są zbrodnie, za które sprawiedliwą karą jest kara śmierci, a jedyną odpowiedzialnością – eliminacja ze społeczeństwa?

– Są czyny, które przekraczają granicę człowieczeństwa. Kto ją przekroczy, traci swe prawo do życia – sam je przekreśla. W Księdze Rodzaju czytamy – co do ludzi, upomnę się o życie każdego u bliźniego jego. Kto przeleje krew ludzką, przez ludzi ma być przelana krew jego – bo człowiek został stworzony na obraz Boży. Toczy się obecnie proces tej upiornej trójki, która utopiła w Wiśle małego chłopca. Przeszkadzał matce w samorealizacji. Jaka inna kara może być tu właściwa, niż główna? Jest ona nieodwracalna i taka ma być! Tylko przez jej nieodwracalność wyraża się nasze nieodwracalne potępienie takiego czynu.

– Jeżeli ludzie mogą się zabijać, zostają naruszone podstawy organizmu społecznego. Ktoś, kto targnął się na cudze życie, stawia się poza społeczeństwem i powinien ponieść adekwatne konsekwencje?

– To jest fundamentalny warunek współżycia społecznego, czego nasi prawnicy nie chcą pojąć w swym dziwnym zaślepieniu lub nie mogą. Społeczeństwo dobrze czuje, że na samowolę, na zło ludzkiej natury, muszą być nałożone kagańce – i to twarde. W sondażach respondenci często uzasadniają potrzebę kary głównej przede wszystkim poczuciem sprawiedliwości. Dla tego, kto popełnia nieludzki czyn, nie ma już miejsca wśród ludzi – i to na zawsze. To mówi nam elementarne, nieskażone poczucie sprawiedliwości, a na nim opiera się cały system prawny. I tę podstawę prawa prawnicy starają się zrujnować. Mówiąc za świętym Tomaszem – jest to corruptio legis, zepsucie prawa.

– Zniesienie kary śmierci oznacza właściwie zakwestionowanie moralności i odpowiedzialności. Także degradację człowieka, który staje się bytem nieokreślonym, działającym pod wpływem otoczenia, emocji. Liberalne prawo czyni człowieka nieodpowiedzialnym, co chyba nie jest korzystne dla społeczeństwa?

– To prawda – liberalna filozofia czyni z człowieka istotę nieodpowiedzialną za swe czyny. Nie w człowieku dopatruje się ich źródła, lecz w okolicznościach, które go rzekomo do nich zmusiły. To jest właśnie główna idea tych, których nazywam prawniczymi laksystami, tych rozluźniaczy rygorów prawa. W przeciwieństwie do nich, rygoryści traktują człowieka jako istotę rozumną i wolną – zrobił, bo chciał. A to, że zrobił tak, a nie inaczej, pokazuje, z jakiego jest nasienia.

– Czy kara śmierci jest moralnie godziwa i dopuszczalna?

– Zostało powiedziane – kto przelewa krew ludzką, przez ludzi ma być przelana krew jego. Przykazania Boże są chyba godziwe? Niech więc ci, co kwestionują moralną dopuszczalność kary głównej, odniosą się najpierw do najstarszego i najpierwszego z Bożych przykazań, zanim zaczną narzucać nam jej namiastkę – karę dożywocia. Jest ono w ogóle fikcją, bo co to za dożywocie, skoro po iluś latach można być z niego zwolnionym? Odwoływalna kara nie wyraża nieodwołalnego potępienia czynu.

– Czy widzi pan możliwość przywrócenia kary śmierci? Abolicjoniści powołują się na Europejską Konwencję o Ochronie Praw Człowieka, która gwarantuje, że nikt nie może być skazany na karę śmierci w czasie pokoju.

– W tej konwencji widać, jak wewnętrznie niespójne jest stanowisko laksystów. W czasie pokoju nie wolno stosować kary głównej, a w czasie wojny można? A to dlaczego? Czemu wojna miałaby tu usprawiedliwiać inne postępowanie? Mimo woli sami przez to ograniczenie przyznają, że, także ich zdaniem, kara śmierci odstrasza.

– Czy społeczeństwo stać na humanitaryzm abolicjonistów? Przecież jest ono z natury rzeczy bardziej narażone na agresję przestępców niż elity polityczne.

– Społeczeństwo fortyfikuje się – zakłada kraty do drugiego piętra, drzwi pancerne, ogradza całe dzielnice i obstawia ochroną. Tak działa laksystyczny system prawny. Dlaczego się go toleruje? – trudno pojąć. Najważniejsze dotąd badania amerykańskie I. Ehrlicha wskazywały, że jedna egzekucja rocznie więcej, to siedem zabójstw mniej. Głównym argumentem za utrzymaniem kary głównej jest jednak nie jej społeczna użyteczność, lecz ludzkie poczucie sprawiedliwości. System prawny, który temu poczuciu usiłuje się przeciwstawić, nie może dobrze funkcjonować, bo niszczy to, na czym jedynie stoi – świadomość prawną społeczeństwa.

**********
Bogusław Wolniewicz jest profesorem filozofii na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, do 1998 roku kierownikiem Zakładu Filozofii Religii w Instytucie Filozofii UW

Sąd ściga filozofa, bo obraził się na sąd

Sąd ściga filozofa, bo obraził się na sąd

Autor: Krzysztof Wójcik
Opublikowal: Adam Wojtasiewicz
2006-11-29 07:24:39
Policja ma zatrzymać Bogusława Wolniewicza, 80-letniego niemal niewidomego filozofa. Tak zdecydował sąd, bo profesor nie chce zeznawać na procesie przeciwko złodziejom, którzy go okradli.

Bogusław Wolniewicz w styczniu 2004 r. został okradziony w pociągu. Policja szybko zatrzymała sprawców. Jeszcze w tym samym roku złodzieje stanęli przed sądem. Na rozprawie Wolniewicz chciał zgłosić wniosek, ale sąd stwierdził, że jako świadek nie ma do tego prawa. - Wcześniej sędzia zwróciła mi uwagę, że siadam w niewłaściwym miejscu. Ja ostatni raz w sądzie byłem 40 lat temu! Stwierdziłem, że dalej w tym nie będę brał udziału, i wyszedłem. Tak nie traktuje się pokrzywdzonego - mówi profesor. Od tamtej pory profesor dostał 14 wezwań do sądu i 6 tys. zł grzywien -sędzia uznała, że "pokrzywdzony bez zgody sądu opuścił salę". Wyroku na złodziei nie ma, bo brakuje zeznań świadka - Bogusława Wolniewicza. Na kolejną rozprawę w grudniu profesora ma zawieźć policja. - Nie powiem ani słowa - mówi Wolniewicz. - To mój protest przeciwko arogancji.

Kierownik sekcji wykonawczej Sądu Rejonowego Warszawa-Śródmieście Mariusz Iwaszko: - W stanowisku sądu nie ma niczego niestosownego. A takie zachowanie, zwłaszcza osoby znanej, nie jest dobrym przykładem dla innych.

(...) Po Bogusława Wolniewicza, okradzionego 80-letniego profesora Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, postać znaną i barwną, sąd wysyła policyjny konwój i zapowiada 48-godzinne zatrzymanie. Sprawa drobna, niebudząca dużych wątpliwości, wynik bardziej nieporozumienia i nerwów, przeradza się w sądowo-policyjny maraton. Aparat sprawiedliwości angażuje swój autorytet, również pieniądze. Nie ma nikogo, kto by dostrzegł absurdalność sprawy i postanowił ją przerwać.

(...) 80-letni profesor Bogusław Wolniewicz specjalizuje się w filozofii religii i filozofii współczesnej. Jest znany z radykalnych poglądów: był jednym z twórców Społecznego Niezależnego Zespołu ds. Etyki Mediów, który ma bronić wolności wypowiedzi w mediach ojca Rydzyka. Bronił Radia Maryja po emisji felietonu Stanisława Michalkiewicza, który Rada Etyki Mediów i Marek Edelman uznali za antysemicki.

Kłopoty profesora zaczęły się w 2004 r. Choć nigdy nie złamał prawa, sąd chce go doprowadzić na salę rozpraw pod eskortą policji. Do tej pory sąd wzywał Wolniewicza kilkanaście razy i nałożył ponad 6 tys. zł grzywien. Wszystko dlatego, że profesor dał się okraść w pociągu.

Warszawska policja szybka jak wiatr

W styczniu 2004 r. naukowiec wracał do Warszawy ekspresem Kopernik z sympozjum w Toruniu. Do jego przedziału dosiedli się dwaj podpici jegomoście. Profesor szybko wysiadł na Dworcu Centralnym.

- Na peronie zorientowałem się, że zniknęła moja torba - opowiada profesor Wolniewicz. - Miałem tam klucze, dokumenty, trochę pieniędzy i materiały naukowe. Popędziłem do domu, żeby zdążyć, zanim złodzieje okradną mieszkanie.

Kiedy jechał do mieszkania na warszawskim Mokotowie, dwaj policjanci na Dworcu Centralnym zauważyli dwóch mężczyzn, którzy na widok mundurowych próbowali zniknąć w podziemiach dworca.

Policjanci zabrali ich na komisariat. Znaleźli przy nich torbę i dokumenty profesora Wolniewicza. Marcin M. i Zbigniew G. twierdzili, że co prawda jechali z profesorem, ale torbę znaleźli na peronie i z kradzieżą nie mają nic wspólnego.

Policjanci zadzwonili do profesora. Bogusław Wolniewicz: - Bardzo się zdziwiłem, kiedy odebrałem ten telefon. Nie spodziewałem się, że policja tak sprawnie działa. Przecież nawet nie zgłosiłem kradzieży.

Profesor odebrał torbę, złożył zeznania. Z pociągu pamiętał Marcina M., ale nie potrafił nic powiedzieć o kradzieży.

Sprawa wydawała się banalnie prosta. Policja zebrała dokumenty, przesłuchała kilku świadków, a wiosną 2004 r. prokurator posłał akta przeciwko oskarżonym do Sądu Rejonowego dla Warszawy-Śródmieścia.

Profesor obraził się na sąd

Sąd wyznaczył pierwszą rozprawę na wrzesień 2004 r. Kiedy spisywał dane oskarżonych, Marcin M. stwierdził, że leczy się z alkoholizmu. Asesor Iwona Konopka zgodnie z przepisami zarządziła wysłanie go na badanie psychiatryczne i odroczyła sprawę.

- Spytałem, czy mogę zgłosić wniosek. Sędzia powiedziała, że jako świadek nie mam prawa składać wniosków - opowiada Wolniewicz. - Wcześniej zwróciła mi uwagę, że siadam w miejscu dla prokuratora, a nie jestem oskarżycielem posiłkowym. Nie wiedziałem o tym, ostatni raz w sądzie byłem 40 lat temu. Wobec takiego podejścia sądu oświadczyłem, że dalej w tym postępowaniu nie będę brał udziału, i wyszedłem z sali. Tak nie traktuje się pokrzywdzonego.

W aktach sprawy nie ma oświadczenia profesora. Jest tylko zapisek: "pokrzywdzony bez zgody sądu opuścił salę".

Od września 2004 r. Wolniewicz dostał już czternaście wezwań do sądu. Ale na nie nie chodzi. - Nie pójdę dla zasady - mówi. - To mój protest przeciwko arogancji sądu. Mogą mnie siłą zawieźć, aresztować, ale ust nie otworzę. Nie tak wyobrażam sobie sprawiedliwość.

Milczenie opóźnia wyrok

Za uporczywe uchylanie się od zeznań Wolniewicz dostał już 6 tys. zł grzywien (po odwołaniach kwota zmniejszyła się do 2,1 tys.). Niedługo miną trzy lata od kradzieży torby, a wyroku na złodziei nadal nie ma, bo brakuje zeznań ostatniego świadka - profesora.

W połowie listopada po Wolniewicza pojechał policyjny konwój - wrócił z pustymi rękami, bo profesor leżał w szpitalu. Ale na kolejną rozprawę w grudniu sąd znów chce go ściągnąć przy pomocy policji. Decyzja pani asesor brzmi: "sąd postanowił zatrzymać na 48 godzin i przymusowo doprowadzić z uwagi na uporczywe niestawiennictwo".

Kierownik sekcji wykonawczej Sądu Rejonowego Warszawa-Śródmieście Mariusz Iwaszko: - W stanowisku sądu nie ma niczego niestosownego. Trzeba mieć świadomość, że takie zachowanie, zwłaszcza osoby znanej, nie jest dobrym przykładem dla innych. Prawo nakłada na świadków obowiązek składania zeznań i stawiennictwa w sądzie. W przypadku profesora nic nie wskazuje na niemożliwość przyjścia do sądu z uwagi na fizyczne schorzenia. Jeśli świadek nic nie będzie mówił, to ponosi takie same konsekwencje, jakby nie stawił się w sądzie. Jeśli ktoś uporczywie nie stawia się na wezwania, to można zastosować nawet 30 dni aresztu - tłumaczy sędzia Iwaszko. Według sędziego uraza profesora do sądu jest niestosowna: jego zeznania ważą na wymiarze kary dla dwóch oskarżonych o kradzież. Obaj odpowiadają z wolnej stopy.

Radio Maryja to jedyna w tej chwili w Polsce rozgłośnia niezależna

[W niedzielnym programie TVN 24, w którym brałem udział - red.] broniłem nie tyle o. Tadeusza Rydzyka, co prawdy. To, co mnie w tej obecnie rozpętanej nagonce - już którejś z rzędu, ale ta wygląda mi jeszcze groźniej niż niektóre wcześniejsze - najbardziej zadziwia, to są dwie rzeczy: przede wszystkim nikczemna kłamliwość tej nagonki. Bo mówi się, że w tych wypowiedziach przypisywanych o. Rydzykowi padły słowa gorszące, skandaliczne, szokujące: "ojciec Rydzyk powiedział, że prezydent to oszust, a prezydentowa to czarownica". O tym, że "oszust" i "czarownica" mówiono jeszcze w piątek o 23.00 w trzecim programie Polskiego Radia i jeszcze się to powtarza, mimo że prof. Jerzy Robert Nowak już we wtorek w "Aktualnościach dnia" wyjaśnił szczegółowo i rzeczowo, że o. Tadeusz nie powiedział o prezydencie, że jest oszustem ani że nie odnosił słowa "czarownica" do pani prezydentowej. To było potem w "Naszym Dzienniku" przedrukowane, ale to się ignoruje. I na tym między innymi polega ta nikczemna kłamliwość. A druga rzecz, która mnie w tej nagonce zadziwia jeszcze bardziej, to udział, włączanie się do tej nagonki środowisk lewacko-antykościelnych duchowieństwa i inteligencji katolickiej. Występują oni z takim listem otwartym do władz kościelnych, w którym piszą: "(...) Ksiądz Rydzyk ujawnił pogardę wobec bliskich. Jako polscy katolicy świeccy i duchowni wyrażamy protest wobec gorszących wypowiedzi, pogardliwych i antysemickich wystąpień..." - takie rzeczy głoszą intelektualiści katoliccy, bo przecież duchowieństwo do intelektualistów należy. Intelektualiści mówią tydzień, a nawet mniej, po tym spotkaniu Rodziny Radia Maryja, po tym spotkaniu tej ogromnej rzeszy, która przyjechała z własnej woli, za własne pieniądze, sama się organizując, sama tam trwając przez tyle godzin. Jestem człowiekiem niewierzącym, jak wiadomo, i zawsze to mówię, ale to jest spotkanie, które mnie chwyta za serce, mnie niewierzącego chwyta za serce, a tych katolickich intelektualistów nie chwyta. Mało tego, że nie chwyta, to robią, co mogą, żeby to opluć. Zaraz potem jednego z organizatorów tego spotkania obrzucają oszczerczymi słowami. Jest w tym jakaś dzika, zaślepiona wrogość wobec waszej rozgłośni, której źródeł pojąć nie potrafię. Nie dziwię się, gdy z taką wrogością spotykam się u pana Aleksandra Smolara. On jest szefem Fundacji Batorego, która jest ekspozyturą pana George’a Sorosa i jego niejasnych celów politycznych na Polskę i niejako jest jego komisarzem. Jeżeli te rzesze, które tydzień temu zebrały się pod Jasną Górą, określa mianem "prostackiego katolicyzmu" Aleksander Smolar, to ja się temu nie dziwię, ale jeżeli w niedzielnej audycji w TVN 24 pan senator Jarosław Gowin, który deklaruje, że jest katolikiem rzymskim wierzącym, mówi to samo, co Smolar, że tę rzeszę trzeba "ucywilizować", to ja tego nie rozumiem. Czy oni nie widzą tego fenomenu, jakim jest wasze radio? I to jest fenom dubeltowy! Bo, po pierwsze: wasze radio jest przecież ośrodkiem i organizatorem wielkiego ruchu społeczno-religijnego w Polsce, powiedziałbym najbardziej dynamicznego ruchu w Polsce, a kto wie, czy dzisiaj i na całym świecie. Ja nie potrafiłbym wskazać równego zjawiska, równego fenomenu. To jest przecież nowoczesne chrześcijaństwo, to chrześcijaństwo, które walczy o odbudowę więzi społecznych, które dzisiejszy świat liberalny niszczy. I to zniszczenie widzi wielu, to widzą też niekatolicy. To jest Ecclesia Militans Moderna. 130 lat temu Leon XIII powiedział, że w Kościele trzeba novis vetera augere, czyli nowymi treściami zasilać nowe dziedzictwo. Bo bez nowych treści to dziedzictwo zwiędnie, a bez oparcia w starym dziedzictwie te nowe treści zwyrodnieją, co zresztą widzimy na olbrzymią skalę dzisiaj. I przecież Radio Maryja to właśnie robi, próbuje novis vetera augere. Łączy się w trudnej niezwykle syntezie dwie rzeczy, które nie jest łatwo połączyć, a zwłaszcza jest niezwykle trudno połączyć je we właściwej proporcji: aktualne treści polityczno-społeczne, które są falą nośną waszego posłania, łączycie z odwieczną treścią dewocyjno-religijną, która jest tym komunikatem, który na tej fali niesiecie. Jak można tego nie doceniać. To widzą i czują ludzie prości, prości, ale nie głupi wcale. A tego nie widzą ci intelektualiści.
A po drugie: czy oni nie widzą, że oprócz tego, iż jest ośrodkiem wielkiego i ważnego ruchu, Radio Maryja to jedyna w tej chwili w Polsce rozgłośnia niezależna, to znaczy działająca poza cenzurą tak zwanej politycznej poprawności, czyli po prostu kosmopolitycznego lewactwa. I to oni chcą zniszczyć w tym swoim liście otwartym i nie mają w zamian nic do zaoferowania. Ale to, co powstało, zniszczyć, to potrafią.
Ostatnia nagonka, ta, która w tej chwili jest w pełnym biegu, stwarza przecież niezwykle groźny precedens. Słusznie wskazywała na to pani prof. Anna Raźny, że widzimy powrót donosicielstwa jako metody zwalczania ludzi politycznie niewygodnych. Jest to takie samo szpiclowanie jak to UB-owskie sprzed pół wieku, z czasów Bieruta, tylko nowej generacji, udoskonalone. Metody są tu bardziej wyrafinowane. Donosicielstwo poczyniło techniczne postępy. Ale to jest ten sam duch. A polscy intelektualiści, katoliccy i niekatoliccy w tym wypadku, zamiast zawrzeć świętym gniewem na samych szpiclów, a przede wszystkim na ich mocodawców, to oni zamiast tego z rykiem wściekłości rzucają się na ofiarę szpiclowania, jaką jest w tym wypadku Ojciec Dyrektor. A jego zwolenników chcą "cywilizować". Czy oni nie widzą, że ta ponura siła, która dziś uderza w o. Tadeusza Rydzyka, jutro uderzy w nich? Zmierza się tutaj do tego, by ludzie bali się otwarcie mówić to, co myślą. Bo wszędzie czuwa "agencja ´ucho´", jak to się kiedyś mówiło. I nie widzą, że to, co spotkało o. Rydzyka, a było to szpiclowanie nauczyciela przez jego słuchaczy, jutro spotka ich na ich seminarium czy wykładzie. A pojutrze spotka to ich gdziekolwiek, w kawiarni, jak powiedzą nieopacznie słowo, albo jakimś towarzystwie, a wreszcie w domu, tak jak było za Bieruta. Tacy są czuli na wolność słowa, ale zaślepiona nienawiść do waszego Radia, dla mnie niepojęta, odbiera im najwyraźniej rozum. Czemu tak skwapliwie gotowi są powielać głos jakiegoś pokątnego donosiciela jako najbardziej miarodajny dla oceny Radia Maryja i jego kierownictwa, a nie to, co wy, Radio, od 15 lat głosicie, w ścisłej ortodoksji, setkom tysięcy, a nawet milionom słuchaczy? To się nie liczy? Liczy się to, co szpicel doniósł. Liczy się głos szpicla jako ostateczne kryterium, jak za Bieruta.
Sprawa Radia Maryja dotknęła także osobę pana prezydenta. Ja nie mogę tu oczywiście do niczego pana prezydenta wzywać ani nic mu radzić, bo mnie przecież o to nie proszono. Ale mogę, jak każdy Polak, zwrócić się do niego z pewną prośbą:
Panie Prezydencie, są w Polsce i poza Polską potężne siły, które za wszelką ceną chcą zdławić Radio Maryja. Siły te przystąpiły znów do ataku, licząc na sprowokowanie Pana do działań po ich myśli. Jako były członek Pańskiego komitetu wyborczego zwracam się do Pana w tej chwili trwogi z usilną prośbą o nieuleganie intrygantom ani głosom ich dziennikarskich donosicieli. Przebrani za świętoszkowatych przyjaciół nie działają oni w polskim interesie narodowym ani dla dobra Kościoła powszechnego, co wielekroć przecież pokazali. Sieją waśń w obozie patriotycznym. To ujawnia ich prawdziwe zamiary. Przepraszam, że mówię rzeczy oczywiste, ale przyszedł czas zamętu, który do tego zmusza. Cokolwiek Pan, Panie Prezydencie, uczyni, ufam, że przyjmie Pan moje słowa jako wypowiedziane w dobrej wierze i w zaufaniu do Pańskiej osoby i do Pańskiego urzędu.

Bogusław Wolniewicz, profesor filozofii,
wypowiedź dla Radia Maryja

Szkołę powinni reformować czynni nauczyciele: poloniści, historycy, biolodzy

To rak, który niszczy edukację. Nie mają oni żadnego kontaktu z realiami nauczania w klasie. O kształcie polskiej szkoły przestali decydować nauczyciele. Władzę w niej przejęli biurokraci. Im bardziej się szkołę reformuje, tym lepiej urzędnik prosperuje. Podobnie jak pedagog i psycholog, którzy obsiedli polską szkołę jak pluskwy. Póki nie pozbędziemy się tych pasożytów nie będzie lepiej.

Szkołę powinni reformować czynni nauczyciele: poloniści, historycy, biolodzy, którzy faktycznie uczą młodzież. To rady pedagogiczne powinny mieć władzę w szkole, a nie wizytatorzy z kuratorium - po pedagogice.

Komentarz ukazał się w Dzienniku.

Bogusław Wolniewicz - urodzony w 1927 roku, filozof i logik. Studiował w latach 1947-1951 na Uniwersytecie Mikołaja Kopernika. Do 1953 r. był asystentem w Katedrze Logiki UMK, a od 1956 r. wykładowcą na WSP w Gdańsku. W 1963 r. został przeniesiony do Katedry Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego z inicjatywy Adama Schaffa. Do 1998 r. był profesorem w Instytucie Filozofii UW

Wittgensteinian Foundations of Non‑Fregean Logic

Wittgensteinian Foundations of Non‑Fregean Logic

Boguslaw Wolniewicz

The term "Non‑Fregean Logic" has been introduced in 1968 by the well‑known Polish logician Professor Roman Suszko to mark the distinction between two kinds of logical systems. A logical system is called by him "Fregean", if for its propositional calculus the following formula holds as a theorem:

(F) P ≡ q → P = q

He calls this formula "the axiom of Frege”, and it is not difficult to see why. (According to Frege's theory of meaning all true propositions denote the same, and similarly—all false ones. Thus if two propositions are materially equivalent, their denotations have to be identical; and exactly this is stated by the formula F.) The foremost example of a Fregean logic is the classical prepositional calculus, but—as we shall see—the three‑valued logic of Łukasiewicz is Fregean too. On the other hand, a logical system is called "Non‑Fregean" if the formula F is rejected in it as a theorem.

Some logicians have objected to drawing any such distinction, on the ground that in the classical propositional calculus there is no identity sign for propositions, and that consequently nothing like the "axiom of Frege" can be a theorem of this particular logical system. This objection, however, has a flavor of spurious innocence, being apparently based on the dubious principle that what is not spoken about doesn't exist. To see this let's note in the first place that the axiom of Frege is deductively equivalent to the following schematic formula:

(F' ) P ≡ q → / Φ (p) ≡ Φ (q) /

Certainly, in the ordinary propositional calculus there is no such schema either. (Though it is present in one of its variants, namely in Leśniewski's protothetics.) But we have there all its particular instances, known as "the laws of extensionality":

p ≡ q → ~p ≡ ~q

p ≡ q → p ∧ r=q ∧ r

and so on.

By these laws whatever holds good of one of two materially equivalent propositions, holds also of the other one. Thus from the point of view of classical propositional logic equivalent propositions are indistinguishable, and being indistinguishable they are by Leibniz's principle identical. This is, however, only another way of stating the axiom of Frege, so what is the point of objecting to it?

The idea of a Non‑Fregean logic goes back to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, where it is introduced right from the start in the thesis:

"1.13 Facts in logical space are the world."

The Tractatus is in the first place a work on the philosophy of logic, and the key to that philosophy is the concept of "logical space". Part of that concept is the idea of a Non‑Fregean logic.

Before going on, something has to be said here concerning Wittgenstein's general philosophical position. In our Marxist literature it is a firmly established opinion that Wittgenstein was a logical positivist, and that consequently his philosophical outlook is that of subjective idealism. This opinion, however, doesn't bear scrutiny. In fact it has been rashly taken over from the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, whose early enthusiasm for the Tractatus was only a sad monument of misunderstanding and a rare specimen of philosophical blindness. Wittgenstein's doctrine is idealistic, no doubt about that. But its idealism is not of the subjectivist variety characteristic of positivism. The doctrine of the Tractatus is a peculiar and powerful variant of objective idealism, and it has much more in common with the doctrines of Plato or Leibniz, than with those of Berkeley and Mach. This again is most readily seen while investigating the philosophical import of the concept of "logical space".

The Tractatus starts from the assumption that the logic of language—its logical syntax—has been already, and in the main correctly, described by the systems of Frege and Russell. But there still remains the big question of a correct interpretation of that description, and it may be put as follows: the logical structure of language being such as described by Frege and Russell, what must be the ontological structure of a reality capable of being described by such a language?

Wittgenstein's answer to this question is embedded in the whole system of the Tractatus, and it may be useful to represent its framework schematically in a simple diagram (due to Suszko):



It is fairly easy to discern in the text of the book particular theses forming the three main parts of its system; e.g. thesis 4.22. "An elementary proposition consists of names" surely belongs to part (1), 3.203: "The name denotes an object", — to part (2), and 2.02: "The object is simple" — to part (3). Thesis 1.13 is obviously an ontological one too, as are, by the way, all the theses numbered “1 ‑ 2.0. . .”.

Now according to Wittgenstein's syntax, language is the totality of propositions, and according to his semantics the correspondence between language and reality has to be of the one‑to‑one type. What then, according to his ontology, is meant here by reality, the one‑to‑one counterpart of the totality of propositions? Reality cannot be identical with the world, for the world is the totality of facts, and to the totality of facts there corresponds in language only the totality of true propositions (= science, 4.11). Since language contains also false propositions, and these do not have counterparts in the totality of facts, it proves to be larger than the world; and the same holds good of reality too. If the overall semantical correspondence is to be preserved, something in reality must answer even to a false proposition. (And it has to be preserved, for if nothing in reality answered to false propositions they would have no relation to it; and being thus out of touch with reality they could not be false, but only meaningless.)

According to the Tractatus the ontological counterpart of a true proposition is a fact; and the ontological counterpart of a false proposition is the possibility of a fact, something that might be the case. (On the other hand, any fact is the actualization of some possibility.) And reality is the totality of all possibilities called by Wittgenstein "logical space". Thus we have the following identities:

Language = the totality of propositions,

Science = the totality of true propositions,

The world = the totality of facts,

Logical space = the totality of possibilities;

and to make their relations even more precise we may present them in the form of a diagram:



The meaning of Wittgenstein's pronouncement in 1.13 is sufficiently clear now: the world is, so to speak, an island of facts in the ocean of possibilities. But this simile is only a useful first approximation to Wittgenstein's idea of logical space. And we proceed now to the second one.

Logical space is the ontological counterpart of language taken as a whole, but what are the counterparts to its particular propositions? According to Wittgenstein to every proposition there corresponds a definite area of logical space, or—as he calls it—a logical place. Thus the logical place of a given proposition "p" may be visualized like this:



It is already apparent that Wittgenstein's idea aims at the construction of a geometrical representation for the logic of propositions, and that his "logical space" is an abstract space like the "phase‑space" of physics or the "sample‑space" of the theory of probability. And this leads immediately to the next and most essential question: what are to be the points of this abstract logical space?

The right answer: to this question has been already given by Stenius (Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus', 1960): every point in logical space is the representation of a possible world! (Stenius' answer is not the only one that has been suggested, but none of the others will do as an interpretation of Wittgenstein's position.) Let's call these worlds "logical points". We have thus:

Logical space = the totality of logical points,

The logical the set of logical points which
place of “p" = would make the proposition "p" true.

One point in logical space is designated: it represents the actual world. (Since each possible world is incompatible with every other the designated point is unique.) Of course, we do not know its exact position; but if we know a proposition "p" to be true, we know the designated point to lie in that area of logical space which is the logical place of "p". Thus we have:

"p" is true = the designated point is contained in the logical place of "p".

According to Frege the denotation of a proposition is its truth‑value; according to Wittgenstein the denotation of a proposition is its logical place (= a set of possible worlds). And 'this makes clear, why formula (F) has to be rejected.

A material equivalence "p ≡ q" means that the propositions “p” and “q” have the same truth-value. Upon our interpretation this corresponds to the following situation in logical space:



A statement of material equivalence "p ≡ q" is true if, and only if. the designated point lies as a matter fact [sic] somewhere in the shaded area of logical space. And this may be the case, or it may not be. On the other hand, an identity statement "p = q” means that the logical places of "p" and "q" coincide; and this cannot be the case here by any means.

But how can formula (F) be a theorem of "Fregean" logic, if it is not valid? To solve this puzzle let us assume for the sake of intuitiveness that there are only three possible worlds, marked by the numbers (1), (2), (3) respectively. Under this assumption the relation between language and reality may be presented in the form of a matrix, with columns of the digits "1" and "0" representing the logical places of the corresponding propositions:

Language

p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8

(1) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

Logical space (2) 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0

(3) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0

In the logical space consisting of only 3 points there are only 8 logical places; and consequently there are in the corresponding language only 8 extensionally distinguishable propositions (i.e. propositions with different denotations).

However, our assumption was quite arbitrary, for there are as yet no obvious reasons against taking any other number—finite or infinite—to be the number of logical points. So let us assume now, that this number is one: There is only one possible world, namely the actual one. Under this assumption we get the following matrix of the relation between language and reality:

Language

p1 p2

Logical space { (1) 1 0

In this matrix there are only two logical places. And since these two logical places (columns) are correlated in a one‑to‑one manner with the two truth‑values (digits), there is neither the need nor the possibility of distinguishing the logical place of a proposition from its truth‑value, or the designated truth‑value from the designated logical point.

But this is exactly the import of the axiom of Frege. According to Frege true propositions are indistinguishable extensionally, for they all denote (bedeuten) one and the same, namely the real world or Being (das Wahre); and similarly with false propositions: they all denote Non‑Being (das Falsche). Therefore Being and Non‑Being are the two logical places of Frege's logic.

The number of logical places (m) depends obviously upon the number of truth‑values (v), and upon the number of logical points (n); and they are interrelated in a most simple way:

(I) m=vⁿ

If our logic is, as usual, a two‑valued one (v = 2), clearly the number of logical places will be: m = 2ⁿ. But to Fregean logic it is not essential to assume that there are only two truth‑values. What is essential to it, is to have the equality:

(II) m = v

which in view of (I) is equivalent to assuming that the number of logical points is one! i.e.:

(F'') n = 1

Formula (F) holds good if, and only if, condition (F'') is satisfied. In other words: the axiom of Frege is equivalent to the assumption that logical space consists of a single point. Obviously this single point is at the same time the designated one.

Frege's logic is a logic of two truth‑values and two logical places, and so it is Fregean. But the three‑valued logic of Łukasiewiez is Fregean too, for its matrix has the form:

Language

p1 p2 p3

logical space { (1) 1 ½ 0

with "½" marking the logical indeterminateness. (According to Łukasiewiez's philosophy this realm of indeterminateness was to be the Future, regarded as something intermediate between Being and Non‑Being; i.e. in our terminology as a third logical place.) But Wittgenstein’s logic is Non‑Fregean, for there are in it two truth values and many logical places, the number of logical points—and consequently also the number of logical places—being kept variable.

In this framework Frege's logic is just a special case of Non‑Fregean logic, but it is also a very peculiar one. This peculiarity consists in its extreme simplicity: to construct a still simpler logic seems out of question [sic]. Formal simplicity is thus the great and indisputable merit of Frege's system of logic, but it is not come free of charge [sic]. It has been based on the assumption that the real coincides with the possible, and both of them with the necessary, that modal distinctions are not concerned with reality, but only with our thoughts.

This assumption may be disputed, but that is not our point. What is to be insisted on here, is only the fact that in Fregean logic there is such an assumption present.

UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW
POLAND


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SOURCE: Wolniewicz, Boguslaw. "Wittgensteinian Foundations of Non-Fregean Logic," in Contemporary East European Philosophy, Vol. 3, edited by Edward D'Angelo, David DeGrood, and Dale Riepe (Bridgeport, CT: Spartacus Books, 1971), pp. 231-243.

The Ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus

The Ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus


Go to the Second Part: Selected Bibliography



Introduction
"The Tractatus comprises four parts, which correspond to stages of its rocky development: the theory of logic (1912-14), the picture theory (1914), the discussion of science and mathematics (1915-17), and the discussion of the mystical (1916-17). The structure of the book is as follows:

Ontology (1-2.063): although the Tractatus is concerned with symbolic representation (Preface), it starts with ontology, since the nature of representation, and of what represents (thought/language), is isomorphic with the nature of what is represented (reality).

Depiction (2.1-3.5): having claimed that the world is the totality of facts, the Tractatus proceeds to investigate a subset of that totality, namely pictures, in particular PROPOSITIONS, that is, facts which are capable of representing other facts.

Philosophy (4-4.2): unlike science, philosophy does not consist of propositions, since the logical form shared by language and reality cannot be expressed in meaningful propositions, but shows itself in empirical propositions (see SAYING/SHOWING).

Theory of logic (4.21-5.641, 6.1-6.13): Wittgenstein uses truth-functional operations to explain the construction of molecular propositions out of elementary ones — thereby providing an account of the GENERAL PROPOSITIONAL FORM — and to establish that logical propositions are tautologies.

Mathematics (6-6.031, 6.2-6.241): mathematics is also explained as an aspect of the logical operations by which propositions are derived from each other.

Science (6.3-6.372): science is treated along Hertzian lines as containing a priori elements, the network of our description of the world. Mysticism (6.373-6.522): ETHICAL and AESTHETICAL value is ineffable. Kicking away the ladder (6.53f.): the Tractatus aims to indicate the limits of the sayable, but acknowledges that its own pronouncements are on the far side of the limit. They should be used as a ladder which can be kicked away once climbed. 'Whereof one cannot speck, thereof one must be silent' (7)."

From: Hans-Johann Glock - A Wittgenstein dictionary - Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, p. 364.




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Frege and Wittgenstein
"For Frege there is some kind of connection between the categories of ontology and the categories of signs. The two primary ontological categories, namely object and function, (39) are in fact linked to the two principal categories of signs, namely saturated expressions and unsaturated expressions. All the different types of objects are linked to saturated expressions and all the types of functions are linked to unsaturated expressions. In what follows we will consider the two main kind of saturated expressions: names and propositions. As we all know, they have both sense and reference. The sense of the name is its Sinn, the mode in which reference is given to us, while reference itself, the Bedeutung, is the object denoted by the name. As regards propositions, their sense is the Gedanke, while their reference is their logical value. It is immediately apparent, therefore, that both categories of signs are articulated into an object (respectively the Bedeutung and the logical value) and into the mode whereby this object is presented to us (respectively the Sinn and the Gedanke). (40) The most debatable aspect of this position concerns propositions.

To understand Frege's account we have to distinguish between 'true' and `false' as properties (that is as unsaturated expressions) from `the True' and `the False' as objects (that is as saturated expressions). When speaking of a logical value as the object referred to by a proposition, we are considering the True and the False as objects and not true and false as properties.

Using a suggestion coming from the last works by Suszko we can distinguish two different kinds of valuation: logical valuation and algebraic valuation. Logical valuations involve what are conventionally called the values of truth and falsity (as unsatured expressions), while those that Suszko termed algebraic valuations assign a referent. (41) By admitting the existence of only two referents, Frege's position collapses logical and algebraic valuations together and thus renders them indistinguishable. (42)

Wittgenstein took up a completely different position, where he rejected –this being the difference whence most of his subsequent distinctions stemmed –what Perzanowski called the principle of semantic homogeneity. According to this principle, the problem of the reference of names and the problem of the reference of propositions are both resolved using similar structures. This is Frege's case, therefore. For Wittgenstein, however, the solution to the nominal reference problem is different from that of the propositional reference problem. For names, the semiotic triangle (name-sense-reference) is reduced by eliminating sense, so that names refer directly to objects and do not require the intermediation of sense. This gives rise to an extremely simple one-to-one correlation. It also means that both names and objects are simple, the one in language the other in reality. By contrast, the simplicity of the name-object semantic relation generates an extremely complex semantic representation for propositions that involves the concepts of 'proposition', 'propositional sign' (preceivable sign of the proposition), 'sense of the proposition' (situation in the logical space connected to the proposition), 'thought' (logical picture of the fact related to the proposition) and 'fact depicted by the proposition'. (43)

It seems, therefore, that there are at least two main different strategies to adopt: if we accept Frege's position that names and propositions are semantically homogeneous entities, we can represent their structures by using the relative semiotic triangles. In this case the procedure is straightforward, and we encounter no major obstacles as long as we accept the idea that Truth and Falsity are in every respect objects of our ontology. If, instead, we follow Wittgenstein and reject the principle of semantic homogeneity, we are stressing that there is an univocal relationship between name and object. On the basis of this relationship each entity is an atom of its universe (the ontological universe in the case of objects, the universe of signs in the case of names). This absolute simplicity as regards names, however, generates major complexity among propositions.

The problem addressed by Wittgenstein was certainly not a new one. The basic issue was whether it was possible to construct an ontologically neutral language. Before Wittgenstein the problem had exercised several other thinkers: Brentano, for example, particularly during his so-called 'reist phase.' The fundamental theoretical problem was how to use language without being trapped by the symbolic features of language itself." pp. 19-21.



(39) Note that function make up a number of other categories (1st level concepts, 2nd level concepts, ..., 1st level dyadic relations, etc.).

(40) I follow Perzanowski's 1993 exposition here. See also Perzanowski 1984 and 1990.

(41) See Suszko 1975.

(42) The principle according to which there are only two referents for propositions I shall call, following Suszko, Frege's axiom. It is interesting to note that the independence of Frege's axiom was demonstrated by Tarski in his doctoral dissertation (1923), where he explicitly compared it with Euclid's Vth postulate. For a brief treatment see Suszko 1977. If all true propositions denote exactly one and the same entity, this means that the real philosophical position underlying the theory is an absolute monism of facts. Suszko's rejection of Frege's axiom prompted him to elaborate his so-called non-Fregean logic. See Suszko 1975 and the paper by Omyla in this volume. [Formal ontology of situations, pp. 173-187]

(43) For details see Perzanowski 1993.

[For the complete bibliographical references, see the pages about Perzanowski, Suszko and Wolniewicz]

From: Roberto Poli - Res, Ens and Aliquid - pp. 19-21 in: Roberto Poli and Peter Simons (eds.) - Formal ontology - Dordrecht, Kuwer academic Publishers, 1996, pp. 1-26.




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Polish Philosophers about Tractatus ontology
(For more details about these philosophers, see the relative pages).


Boguslaw Wolniewicz
"The present set of studies was started long ago in an effort to grasp more clearly the metaphysical system sketched out in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", and to evaluate its implications. The basic tenets of that system are the theses:

1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

1.2 The world splits into facts."

Thesis 1.1 propounds an ontology of facts; thesis 1.2 propounds a variant of it, known as Logical Atomism.

The studies are based on two concepts. One is that of an "elementary situation", intended as an intermediary between Wittgenstein's "Sachverhalt" and "Sachlage". ("Sachverhalte" are those elementary situations which are atomic and "Sachlagen" are certain sets of the former.) The other is that of a proposition being "verified" by an elementary situation. It has soon turned out that the key to the former concept is lattice theory; and that the latter has to be characterized via the meta-logical concept of a complete set of propositions. The link between them is the concept of a "realization" (or a "possible world"), generalizing Wittgenstein's "Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten der Elementarsätze": realizations are maximal sets of elementary situations, and complete sets of propositions are their images.

In all of the following our point of departure is a universe SE of elementary situations. We consider it at three levels of generality, corresponding to the course our investigations have taken in time. At the first level the universe SE is a lattice, conditionally distributive and of finite length. (Conditional distributivity means here that the identity x Ù (y Ú z) = (x Ù y) Ú (x Ù z) holds only under the proviso that y Ú z ¹ 1.) At the second it appears as an arbitrary join-semilattice with unit. And at the third one it forms merely a quasi-ordering induced by a closure system."

From: Logic and metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein's ontology of facts. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne 1999. p. 11.

"The Tractatus is a masterpiece of rare power and ravishing beauty. Its content is a profound and highly coherent philosophy of language, based upon a radically new kind of metaphysics: the metaphysics of facts and situations. (Meinong, with his notion of the 'objective' of a proposition, apparently was moving in the same direction. But he never came near asking himself any of the two crucial questions: (1) When, if ever, are the objectives of different propositions identical? (2) What, if any, is the relation of the objective of a compound proposition to the objectives of its components?) Moreover, the Tractatus anticipated many of the later developments of logical semantics, especially those commencing around 1950 and connected with its algebraization. The kernel of its message may be put down as follows.

The fundamental problem of the Tractatus, as of all philosophy, concerns the relationship of thought and reality. This relationship is mediated by language, and so it may be decomposed into the relative product of two relations: one between thought and language, the other between language and reality. Let us mark the latter by 'j' , the former by 'y'.

It has been maintained that according to the Tractatus the projective relation j between language and reality has to be an isomorphism. This, however, is not borne out by the text. To satisfy the conditions laid down by Wittgenstein it is enough for j to be a homomorphism, and this already makes a lot of a difference. In the first place, we are confronted now with two delicate questions: (1) Which is the direction of that homomorphism: from language to reality, or the other way round? (2) Is it a homomorphism onto, or merely one into? Neither of these questions has a trivial answer in the context of the Tractatus.

We assume here that the relation j is a homomorphism on the language L onto the reality R, i.e., that (j : L ® R. Thus reality is a homomorphic image of language. But language is the totality of propositions, and the reference of meaningful propositions are possible situations. Consequently, reality is not the world, but the logical space; i.e., it is not the totality of facts, but the totality of possibilities. Thus language is more capacious than the world, and the number of propositions is greater than even that of situations.

The simplest non-trivial homomorphism of that kind is the well-known Fregean one. Language is mapped under it onto the set of the two classic truth-values, and the corresponding two-element Boolean algebra is then the logical space. Thus for Frege there are just two possible situations: the True and the False. This is so because his only stipulation with regard to the reference of propositions is that contradictory propositions cannot have the same reference. In the Tractatus, however, it is stipulated further that logically independent propositions cannot have the same reference either. This move is the gist of its logical atomism, transforming the Fregean homomorphism j : L ® {1, 0} into the composition of two other ones: j' on L onto logical space, and j" on logical space onto the set of truth-values. (1)

The aim of the Tractatus was to stake out the boundaries of clear thought:



Philosophy (...) should trace the unthinkable from within by means of the thinkable. By presenting clearly what may be expressed it will point to the inexpressible. (2)



The positivistically-minded members of the Vienna Circle deemed to recognize in these words their own 'demarcation problem', together with their own hostility towards 'metaphysics' and their cult of 'science'. It was a monumental misunderstanding. To Wittgenstein the metaphysical is indeed the inexpressible, but this is not to mean that it is regarded as some kind of delusion or hoax. On the contrary, the hoax is the idea of a 'scientific philosophy'.

In the Tractatus the tracing of the boundaries of the inexpressible was to be accomplished at one stroke. Logical space R fills the realm of the expressible E completely, i.e., we have E = R. Consequently, the homomorphism j' is onto the expressible, and what is left, evidently, is only the inexpressible. This grandiose project, however, was soon to encounter grave technical difficulties, and then Wittgenstein simply dropped it. This was rash. Not all the difficulties were quite as insuperable as they might have seemed, and the Tractatus left room for manoeuvre. It might have been helpful, for instance, to weaken the homomorphism (j' to one into the expressible. Then instead of the one language L we could consider a whole series of languages L0, L1, ..., and a corresponding series of logical spaces R0, R1,... . The realm of the inexpressible would be approximated by the latter 'from within' starting from what is expressible in the language L0 at hand. Certainly, the series of logical spaces need not be monotonic, and in advance there would be no telling whether what is inexpressible at a given stage L1 is absolutely or only relatively so. Thus the final tracing of the boundaries of the inexpressible would recede to infinity, but for theory this could hardly count as an objection."



(1) For details cfr. B. Wolniewicz - A Wittgensteinian semantics for propositions. In Intention and intentionality. Essay in honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Edited by Diamond Cora and Teichman Jenny. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1979. pp. 165-178

(2) L. Wittgenstein - Tractatus logico-philosophicus 4.113-4.114.

ibid., pp. 13-15.



"Part I.

More than once Professor Anscombe has expressed doubt concerning the semantic efficacy of the idea of an 'elementary proposition' as conceived in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself eventually discarded it, together with the whole philosophy of language of which it had been an essential part. None the less the idea is still with us, and it seems to cover theoretical potentialities yet to be explored. This paper is a tentative move in that direction.

According to Professor Anscombe,1 Wittgenstein's 'elementary propositions' may be characterized by the following five theses:

(1) They are a class of mutually independent propositions.

(2) They are essentially positive.

(3) They are such that for each of them there are no two ways of being true or false, but only one.

(4) They are such that there is in them no distinction between an internal and an external negation.

(5) They are concatenations of names, which areabsolutely simple signs.

We shall not investigate whether this is an adequate axiomatic for the notion under consideration. We suppose it is. In any case it is possible to modify it in one way or another, and for the resulting notion still to preserve a family resemblance with the original idea. One such modification is sketched out below.

Part II

Let us assume the reference of contingent propositions to be possible situations. This fundamental notion is really an offshoot of the correspondence theory of truth. For let a be any true proposition, and let the line R represent all reality in Wittgenstein's sense (i.e., the totality of facts) as shown in Fig. 1:



Fig. 1

Being true, a corresponds to reality, but not all reality is relevant to that. Consequently, R splits up into the segment A referred to by a, and into the vague remainder indifferent to it. Thus A represents here the smallest fragment of reality warranting the truth of a. This is the reference of a, but obviously its truth is warranted also by any fragment A' greater than A. In that case we shall say: a is verified by A'. And any fragment of reality fit to verify a proposition is to be called a situation.

This much is just common sense. The next step, however, is an extremely controversial one, for we expand now the notion of reference so as to cover false propositions as well. Since there are no facts (i.e., real situations), to correspond to them, we postulate to that purpose imaginary ones. Both are possible, and so the totality of facts is embedded in the totality of possibilities. This consists of' all the situations which can be described in the language considered. In a Pickwickian sense we shall still say that a proposition a is verified by a possible situation A, but now that only means that if A were real, a would be true.

An imaginary situation is a non-being. Hence to admit them as the reference of false propositions is to infringe what Plato had called 'the ban of the great Parmenides' : 'Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that non-being is'. (2) In this, however, we follow in the steps of the great Frege, whose minimal semantics for propositions still admits of two situations: (3) the one real (das Wahre), the other one imaginary (das Falsche). The former corresponds to 'the One' of Parmenides and to the totality of facts' of Wittgenstein; the latter obviously has no counterpart in Parmenides, and no clear-cut counterpart in Wittgenstein." pp. 165-166.

From: A Wittgensteinian semantics for propositions. In Intention and intentionality. Essay in honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Edited by Diamond Cora and Teichman Jenny. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1979. pp. 165-178




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Roman Suszko
"Ludwig Wittgenstein attempted in the Tractatus to build a theory of the epistemological opposition:

Mind (language) - Reality (being)

One may distinguish in the Tractatus the three following components:

1. Ontology, i.e., a theory of being,

2. Syntax, i.e., a theory of the structure of language (mind),

3. Semantics, i.e., a theory of the epistemological relations between linguistic expressions and reality.

I present below the formalized version of Wittgenstein's ontology. The syntax and semantics contained in Tractatus will be not considered here.

Wittgenstein's ontology is general and a formal theory of being. It may be called here shortly: ontology. It concerns (independently of time and space) (*), situations (facts, negative facts, atomic and compound situations) and objects. Thus, the ontology is composed of two parts:

1. s-ontology, i.e., the ontology of situations (Sachlagen),

2. o-ontology, i.e., the ontology of objects (Gegenstände).

The link between the two parts of ontology consists in the somewhat mysterious concept of a state of affairs (Sachverhalt) and that of a configuration of objects. The s-ontology is an original theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

It is related in a sense to certain conceptions of G. Frege and to the formalized system of protothetics of St. Lesniewski. The theories of Frege and Lesniewski make use of sentential variables and of operators (e.g. quantifiers) binding them. The s-ontology is also to be formalized by means of sentential variables and corresponding operators binding them.

This is the cause of a certain strangeness of s-ontology and, consequently, of the whole of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Firstly, most formalized languages of contemporary mathematical logic do not use bound sentential variables. On the other hand, the Tractatus essentially uses natural language and the notions and statements of s-ontology formulated in this language may seem to be produced by hypostatising thinking. Certainly, thinking in natural language is much more appropriate to the o-ontology than to s-ontology. Consequently, mathematical thinking in its historical development up to to-day is concerned with (abstract) objects and not situations." p. 8.



(*) There is an opinion that mereology, a formal theory built by St. Lesniewski, is a suitable basis for the theory of spatiotemporal relations.

From: Ontology in the Tractatus of L. Wittgenstein, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 9: 7-33 (1968).




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jerzy Perzanowski
"The main aim of my paper is to supply evidence that ontology and semantics of the Tractatus (as well as further philosophical theories which are to be found therein) are much more coherent and interconnected than it is usually believed.

2. One evidence comes from the history of Wittgenstein's working on the Tractatus which is now well-known due, mainly, to the efforts of Professors G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright.

Wittgenstein started with the basic question of the philosophy of logic: Why does logic (4) work? The study of this problem led him to questions concerning the nature of language and next to ontological considerations. In Wittgenstein's own words ". . . Yes, my work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world. . . " (Tractatus 2.8; Notebooks 1914-1916 p. 79). The final text of the Tractatus is logically ordered, i.e. from ontology via theory of language to philosophy of logic, which is the reverse of the historical order of Wittgenstein's investigations.

It may be interesting to add that the conversion of the first philosophy of Wittgenstein into the second one may be outlined as passing from basing philosophy of language and philosophy of logic upon ontology to grounding it on pragmatics and/or epistemology.

3. Surely, essential evidence would be more welcome than a historical one. It may come from a careful, point-by-point reading of the Tractatus, with emphasis put on, let's say; the "deductive closure" of it: on the logical connections between particular Tractarian theses, on their consequences, on looking for arguments and interpretations which eliminate apparent inconsistencies of the Tractatus. For such a method of reading it is really important to solve "puzzles" found in the text. But before discussing several puzzles I wish to present, the most important data concerning the Tractatus ontology should be recalled.

4. The ontological part of the Tractatus occupying its first few pages consists of 49 theses:

1-2063 and concerns 65 notions —from "the world" and "what is the case" in 1 to the "independent" in 2.061 — introduced with the frequency vrying from 21 uses of one notion (object — Gegenstand and state of affairs—Sachverhalt) to notions mentioned only once. From the frequency point of view the ontology of the Tractatus is the ontology of objects and states of affairs, but understanding it as the ontology of objects, states of affairs and facts is more common and reasonable.

A very brief account of the Tractatus ontology is as follows: The world is the totality of facts, facts are constituted by states of affairs consisting of objects standing in relations to each other. Objects are simples, the rest consists of complex items (states of affairs, facts, situations, the world): What is complex has a structure, i.e. the way objects hang together in the item and the stuff (or substance), i.e. a collection of objects included in the item: The object is the item which is constant; fixed and necessary, whereas the configuration of objects (complex item!) is the item which is changeable and contingent. Which configuration is possible is determined by internal (essential) properties of objects entering into a given configuration, by their nature. Let me recall 2.012: In logic nothing is accidental, if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself." p. 224-225

(...)

"10. Now let me pass to the most discussed question of the Tractatus ontology: What are Tractarian objects? Universals? Particulars? Objects of acquaintance? Colours? Geometrical points? and so on.

Many authors, basing their opinion on very few examples, and rather cryptic Tractarian, comments, try to state a general view on Tractatus objects. This seems to be rather hopeless, mainly because the ontology of the Tractatus is indeed a purely "logical" construction, what, according to Wittgenstein's opinion from the time of Tractatus' writing (12), relieve him from a duty to decide a purely empirical question—whether this thing or that is a simple thing or a complex thing.

Therefore, I do not look for concrete examples of objects and I won't hazard establishing a general view on Tractarian objects. Instead, I should like to write a few words of warning, listed in five points below.

(i) Tractarian objects are simples, items which are opposed to complex ones. These two notions: simple—complex are conjugate. Hence any theory of objects must at the same time be a theory of complexes, and any family of concrete objects generates a family of connected complexes. To say which items are objects means to solve the analogous question for complexes.

(ii) The opposition "simple-complex" is relative to a given analysis (See Notebooks 1914-1916), i.e. to a given language of analysis and to some methods of decomposition. Hence, any fruitful discussion of this opposition has to start with description of the language of analysis, particularly with, delimitation and classification of its names, and with indicating the methods of analysis. Let me recall that no language of analysis is described in the Tractatus in a satisfactory way!

(iii) By choosing appropriate language and method(s) of analysis we, in fact, determine its results. This two-parameter relativeness is the most important facet we should take into account when discussing the problem of objects. Several options, all of them in accordance with Tractatus ontology, are left open therein.

(iv) Particularly, taking appropriate "part-whole" methods of analysis (and, of course, an appropriate language) we obtain a very popular option that objects are individuals (or atoms), whereas complexes are some—combinatorial or mereological, etc.—combinations of atoms.

However, if we use method of logical analysis, i.e. when we ask which names of a given language are undefinable, we conclude that category of simples consists of, on the one hand,

all names ostensibly defined (i.e. by indication of examples. as for instance colours), and, on the other hand, the most general notions of the language (i.e. universals), which —according to the classical theory of definition — are undefinable. To indicate complexes is much more difficult task in the case considered. For instance, some of them must be items equivalent to combinations of universals, f.ex. individuals if we accept the "bundle" theory of individuals (an individual is equivalent to the bundle of all its properties!).

Of course, choosing appropriate language and methods we may obtain also the phenomenalistic option: objects are Russellian objects of acquaintance (sense data). In this case complexes would be like Machian bundles of sensations.

All these conceptions, if only in accordance with Tractatus main claims, are only particularizations of more general Tractatus ontology; they are rather metaphysical than ontological theories.

(v) Bearing in mind how heavily Tractarian ontology depends on objects, esp. on their internal properties, we must, in any option, answer carefully not only what complexes are, but also we should decide what their internal properties are. This important question is very frequently overlooked, perhaps because it is not possible to discuss this question in the original language of analysis. For such a discussion we must introduce a stronger (meta-) language!

11. To sum up, according to the outlined interpretation the Tractatus ontology is, very modal indeed. Not only because many fundamental notions are modal ones, including the notion of "form" which, as I try to show, is the central notion of the Tractatus ontology; but also because the Tractatus ontological machinery works according to rules taking into account both what is done and what can be done—all what is possible (remember—the logical space!). Moreover, it should be pointed out that the crux of the interpretation lies not exactly in emphasising the role played by "form" in the Tractatus (What was observed previously by several observant authors), but in its explication (II) with subsequent comments which makes clear how heavily Tractarian ontology is based on objects, esp. on their internal properties (*) — much more heavily than it is usually recognized.

Is my interpretation right? I am offering the following four arguments to support it:

FIRST, I was trying to be so close to Wittgenstein's own words as possible;

SECOND, The interpretation solves in the uniform way several notorious puzzles of the Tractatus;

THIRD, It gives insights into the coherent construction of the main body of the Tractatus, particularly—through the outlined ontological solutions to the semantical puzzles discussed previously—into the way in which Tractarian semantics is based on ontology.

Let me also recall—and this is meant to be an addition to all three first arguments—Wittgenstein's well-known dissatisfaction with early interpretations of the Tractatus, which later on have become standard. The Tractatus ontology seems to be much more close to continental tradition of objects' ontology than it was recognized i.a. by B. Russell and F. Ramsey.

And—last but not least—

FOURTH, When we compare the text of the Tractatus with the text of the Prototractatus we note that Wittgenstein's amendments are, in fact, responsible for the second and the third puzzle. Namely, both 2.033 as well as the theses defining (in the spirit of 2.033) the form of objects, and—in the course—the second definition of the form of representation are not to be found in the Prototractatus, all of them were introduced into the text in the last period of Wittgenstein's working on the Tractatus.

I don't believe that Wittgenstein's intention was to spoil the Tractatus, on the contrary—I do believe—that he introduced these amendments to point out the intended meaning of the text."

(*) Both Wittgenstein's terminology (internal—external) and his claims about the nature of objects, par ticularly 2.012-2.0141, confronts us with the following questions: Either the structure of a given configuration consists only of one relation or it may be factorized into relations: Such "structure" relation, in turn, is determined by the nature of objects (i.e. internal properties) standing in it. The relations of a given structure, using the terminology of F. H. Bradley as presented in B. Russell My philosophical development (1959), are internal relations. Hence any relation is the internal one (the axiom of internal relations), provided, that to be a relation is to be a relation in some structure. However, in Russell's opinion the axiom of internal relations implies monism, whereas Tractarian ontology is a pluralistic one. Therefore, the problem of connections between monism and the axiom of internal relations should be reexamined.

From: Some ontological and semantical puzzles of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In Aesthetics. Proceedings of the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 15th - 21st August 1983, Kirchberg am Wessel (Österreich). Edited by Haller Rudolf. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1984. pp. 224-230



"Towards Post-Tractatus Ontology. 1. Surely the above title is rather dark. Therefore, let me start with a few words of clarification. "Post-Tractatus" means either after "Tractatus" or a natural prolongation of the books' sequence: "Proto-Tractatus", "Tractatus",... . Hence the title of this paper means either the task of developing ontology built up after "Tractatus" clues, by taking its claims and lesson seriously, or clarification of the "Tractatus" text, by explaining notions and providing its claims with well-grounded arguments, trying thus to develop, step by step, a more advanced and better argumented version of Wittgenstein's treatise. As regards Tractarian ontology realizations of the first task are still rather rare. Instead, most of investigators try to adapt ontology of the "Tractatus" to more common and advanced frameworks, looking for its reconstruction. Quite a lot of people, however, have been involved in realization of the second task (1), producing jointly quite convincing explication of Wittgenstein's text and thus opening a way to the proper post-Tractatus investigations.

(...)

Tractarian Ontology. 3. A brief account of the Tractatus ontology is as follows: The world is the totality of facts. Facts are constituted by states of affairs consisting of things (2) connected together, hence standing in relations to each other. Things are simples, the rest consists of complex items (states of affairs, facts, situations, the world). Every complex has a structure, i.e. the way things hang together in the item, and the substance – formed by complex's things, usually treated as the collection of simples included in the item. It also has a form, intermediary between the substance and the structure, defined as the possibility of the structure. As regards things, they have no structure; they have, however, both the substance and the form. The substance of a thing includes the thing itself, whereas the form of a thing is the possibility of its occurring in appropriate states of affairs (complexes). In addition, things are unalterable, subsistent, necessary and stable; whereas complexes are changeable, accidental and unstable. Things constitute the foundation of the (onto)logical space – the space of all possible states of affairs (more generally – complexes or configurations). Which configuration is possible is determined by internal (essential) properties of things entering into a given configuration. Indeed, by 2.012 the possibility of a thing's occurrence in a state of affairs (configuration) must be written into the thing itself.

This formal substance-determination is basic and necessary. It produces (determines) all basic (or atomic) complexes and, further, the rest of complexes. Synthesis of atomic configurations is thereby no accidental, for things are mutually dependent, but, on the contrary, synthesis of non-atomic complexes is, to some extent, accidental, for states of affairs (complexes) are independent of one another (2.061)."



(1) Let me mention a few: pioneer works of R. Carnap [1934], A. Maslow [1961], G. E. M. Anscombe [1959] and E. Stenius [1960]; books by J. Griffin [1964], B. Wolniewicz [1968], [1985], M. and J. Hintikka [1968], D. Pears [1987]; and the series of papers representing respectively: Warsaw lattice-theoretical approach – R. Suszko [1968a], [1968b], [1975], B. Wolniewicz [1982], [1983], [1985], M. Omyla [1982], [1986]; its Boolean version – G. J. Lockhorst [1988]; set-theoretical approach – J. Czermak [1978], [1979], K. Mudershach [1978] and others; its combinatorial version – B. Skyrms [1981] and D. Armstrong [1986]; mereological approach – P. Simons [1986]; geometrical interpretation – L. Goddard and B. Judge [1982], etc. Papers dealing with Tractarian modalities should also be mentioned. Most of them look for appropriate modal logics of the "Tractatus", e. g. R. Carnap's [1946], D. Kaplan's [1964], B. Wolniewicz's [1969], [1972], G. H. von Wright's [1972], [1982], N. B. Cocchiarella's [1974], [1975], G. J. Lockhorst's [1988], and mine [1985], [1989].

[Complete references are given in the Selected Bibliography.]

(2) From two Wittgenstein's names for simples: things or objects I prefer the former, as the latter by its extreme generality is very useful to denote any item under consideration. Therefore, in combination ontology we change terminology a bit: simple item is called "element", complex - "combination" or still "complex", whereas "object" means both.

From: Towards post-Tractatus ontology. In Wittgenstein. Towards a re-evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, centenary celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989 Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria). Edited by Haller Rudolf, Haller, and Brandl Johannes. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990. pp. 185-186.



"23. Both the Tractarian ontology and its semantics are based on two fundamental oppositions: simple - complex, actual - possible.

The first opposition is defined with respect to a given analysis. Notice double relativeness of this opposition - with respect to the language of analysis and its methods.

Actual means: real or existing. Remember that Tractarian possibilities are necessary, whereas facts are contingent.

24. As regards principles, let me note first that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein has accepted Frege's function-paradigm principle.

Trying to find solid foundations to logic and language he was using, it seems, at least four additional principles:

The Principle of Grounding, or Actuality: What is possible must be, ontologically, grounded on what is real; the realm of possibilities has to be based on the realm of facts, the world.

This is a very old and fashionable philosophical rule used explicitely, inter alia, by Leibniz.

The Principle of Uniformity: All possibilities (possible worlds) are ontologically equivalent. In other words, the (onto)logical space - the space of all possibilities - is uniform in the sense in which in physics we speak about uniformity of the physical space. i.e., no possibility (possible world) is ontologically distinguished; spaces generated seperately by two possible worlds are the same, they are ontologically indistinguishable.

The principle has several applications in the Tractatus, inter alia, direct - in mysterious theses 2.022, 2.023 and 2.025 claiming jointly that any possible world has the same form (=unum formae), probably substance too, as the real one; and indirect - in claim of simple facts' independence.

While the first principle is very Leibnizian in spirit, the last is strongly anti-Leibnizian.

The Principle of Concreteness: A priori (purely formal) components should be eliminated.

The principle expresses an anti-Russellian move of Wittgenstein against Russell's theory of judgements as claiming that any judgement contains an apriori component, its logical form. This move implies that the notion of form should be defined in a way connecting it with ontological concrets - things. And indeed such a definition was provided by Wittgenstein in 2.033.

Once again the principle is very traditional. It motivates, for instance, Leibniz's nominalism or Bradley's critique of relations.

Chance and Necessity Principle: Everything is a fruit of chance and necessity; to be possible is necessary, to exist - contingent.

The principle is stated explicitely in the Tractatus: in thesis 2.012 - In logic nothing is contingent, and in 1.21 - Each item (in the world - J. P.) can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.

It is a very old principle of Democritus, having many occurrences both in philosophy and in science."

From: What is non-Fregean in the semantics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and why? - Axiomathes, 1993, 4, pp. 366-367

Prof.Boguslaw Wolniewicz and the Formal Ontology of Situations

Boguslaw Wolniewicz and the Formal Ontology of Situations


INTRODUCTION

"The theory presented below was developed in an effort to clarify the metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The result obtained, however, is not strictly the formal twin of his variant of Logical Atomism. but something more, general, of which the latter is lust a special case. One might call it an ontology of situations. Some basic ideas of that ontology stern from Stenius Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Oxford, 1968 and Suszko Ontology in the Tractatus of L. Wittgenstein - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1968.

Let L be a classic propositional language. Propositions of L are supposed to have their semantic counterparts in the realm of possibility, or as Wittgenstein put it: in logical space. These counterparts are situations, and S is to be the totality of them. The situation described by a proposition a is S(a). With Meinong we call it the objective of a."

From: Boguslaw Wolniewicz - A formal ontology of situations - Studia Logica 41: 381-413 (1982). pp. 381-382.



"Different ontologies adopt different notions of existence as basic. Aristotle's paradigm of existence is given by the equivalence:

(A) to be = to be a substance.

On the other hand, the paradigm of existence adopted in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is given by the parallel equivalence:

(W) to be = to be a fact.

Now, an Aristotelian substance is the denotation of an individual name, whereas a Wittgensteinian fact is the denotation of a true proposition. It seems therefore that the notions of existence derived from these two paradigms should be quite different, and one might readily expect that the metaphysical systems erected upon them will display wide structural discrepancies.

It turns out, however, that in spite of this basic difference there runs between these two systems a deep and striking parallelism. This parallelism is so close indeed that it makes possible the construction of a vocabulary which would transform characteristic propositions of Wittgenstein's ontology into Aristotelian ones, and conversely. To show in some detail the workings of that transformation will be the subject of this paper.

The vocabulary mentioned is based on the following four fundamental correlations:



Aristotle
Wittgenstein

1) primary substances (substantiae primae)
atomic facts
2) prime matter (materia prima)
objects

3) form (forma)
configuration

4) self-subsistence of primary substances (esse per se)
independence of atomic facts




Aristotle's ontology is an ontology of substances, Wittgenstein's ontology is an ontology of facts. But concerning the respective items of each of the pairs (1)-(4) both ontologies lay down conditions which in view of our vocabulary appear to be identical. To show this let us confront, to begin with, the items of pair (1): substances and facts.

(The interpretation of Aristotle adopted in this paper is the standard one, to be found in any competent textbook of the history of philosophy. Therefore, with but one exception, no references to Aristotle's works will be given here.)Relatively to the system involved substances and facts are of the same ontological status. Aristotle's world is the totality of substances (summa rerum), Wittgenstein's world is the totality of facts (die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen). For Aristotle whatever exists in the basic sense of the word is a primary substance, for Wittgenstein - an atomic fact. Moreover, both ontologies are MODAL ones, allowing for different modes of being (modi essendi); and both take as basic the notion of `contingent being' (esse contingens), opposed to necessary being on the one hand, and to the possibility of being on the other. Both substances and facts are entities which actually exist, but might have not existed. The equality of ontological status between substances and facts is corroborated by the circumstance that both are PARTICULARS, there being - as the saying goes - no multiplicity of entities which FALL UNDER them.

Substances and facts stand also in the same relation to the ontological categories of pairs (2) and (3). Both are always COMPOUND entities, a substance consisting of matter and form, and a fact consisting of objects and the way of their configuration. But in neither of the two systems is this compoundness to be understood literally as composition of physically separable parts or pieces. The compoundness (compositio) of a substance consists in its being formed stuff (materia informata), and the compoundness of a fact in its being a configuration of objects.

In view of correlation (4) we have also an equality of relation which a substance bears to other substances, and a fact to other facts. Self-subsistence is the characteristic attribute of primary substances: substantia prima = ens per se. If we take this to mean that each substance exists independently of the existence or non-existence of any other substance we get immediately the exact counterpart of Wittgenstein's principle of logical atomism stating the mutual independence of atomic facts. It should be noted that thus understood the attribute of self-subsistence or independence is a relative one, belonging to a substance - or to a fact - only in virtue of its relation to other substances - or facts.

From a Wittgensteinian point of view Aristotle's substances are not things, but hypostases of facts, and thus their names are not logically proper names, but name-like equivalents of propositions. (By that term we mean roughly either a noun clause of the form `that p', or any symbol which might be regarded as a definitional abbreviation of such clause.) Surely, from the Aristotelian point of view it might be easily retorted here that just the opposite is the case: substances are not `reified' facts, but on the contrary - facts are 'dereified' substances. Without passing judgement on these mutual objections let us note in passing that their symmetric character seems to be itself an additional manifestation of the parallelism discussed."

From: Boguslaw Wolniewicz - A parallelism between Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian ontologies. In Boston studies in the philosophy of science. Vol. IV. Edited by Cohen Robert S. and Wartofsky Marx W. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1969. pp. 208-210 (notes omitted).




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS (Works in Polish are not enclosed)

In 1970 Boguslaw Wolniewicz published a Polish translation of Ludwig Wittgenstein Tractatus logico-philosophicus.

A difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. In Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie. Wien, 2. - 9. September 1968 - Vol. II. Wien: Herder 1968. pp. 263-267
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp.193-197

"A note on Black's 'Companion'," Mind 78: 141 (1969).
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - p. 229.

"It is a mistake to suppose that in Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" the meaning of Urbild has any connexion with that of picture. "

A parallelism between Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian ontologies. In Boston studies in the philosophy of science. Vol. IV. Edited by Cohen Robert S. and Wartofsky Marx W. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1969. pp. 208-217
Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the philosophy of science 1966/1968.

Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp.198-207

"Four notion of independence," Theoria 36: 161-164 (1970).
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp.127-130.

WFour (binary) relations of independence I(p,q) between propositions are distinguished: the Wittgensteinian I sub-w, the statistical I sub-s, the modal I sub-m, and the deductive I sub-d. The validity of the following theorem is argued for: I sub-w(p,q) implies I sub-s(p,q) implies I sub-m(p,q) implies Isub-d(p,q). "

Wittgensteinian foundations of non-Fregean logic. In Contemporary East European philosophy. Vol. 3. Edited by D'Angelo Edward, DeGrood David, and Riepe Dale. Bridgeport: Spartacus Books 1971. pp. 231-243

"The notion of fact as a modal operator," Teorema: 59-66 (1972).
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp. 218-224

"The notion of fact /fp = "it is a fact that p"/ is characterized axiomatically, and the ensuing modal systems shown to be equivalent to tT, S4 and S5 respectively."

Zur Semantik des Satzkalküls: Frege und Wittgenstein. In Der Mensch - Subjekt und Objekt (Festchrift für Adam Schaff). Edited by Borbé Tasso. Wien: Europaverl. 1973. pp.

Sachlage und Elementarsätz. In Wittgenstein and his impact on contemporary thought. Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria). Edited by Leinfellner Elisabeth. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1977. pp. 174-176

"Objectives of propositions," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 7: 143-147 (1978).
"The paper sketches out a semantics for propositions based upon the Wittgensteinian notion of a possible situation. The objective of a proposition is defined as the smallest situation verifying it. Two propositions are assumed to have the same objective iff they are strictly equivalent. Formulas are given which determine the objectives of conjunction and disjunction as functions of the objectives of their components. finally a link with possible-world semantics is established."

"Situations as the reference of propositions," Dialectics and Humanism 5: 171-182 (1978).
"The reference of propositions is determined for a class of languages to be called the "Wittgensteinian" ones. A meaningful proposition presents a possible situation. Every consistent conjunction of elementary propositions presents an elementary situation. The smallest elementary situations are the "Sachverhalte"; the greatest are possible worlds. The situation presented by a proposition is to be distinguished from that verifying it, but the greatest situation presented is identical with the smallest verifying. The reference of compound propositions is then determined as a function of their components."

"Les situations comme corrélats semantiques des enoncés," Studia Filozoficzne 2: 27-41 (1978).

Wittgenstein und der Positivismus. In Wittgenstein, the Vienna circle and critical rationalism. Proceedings of the third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th to 19th August 1978, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria). Edited by Bergehel Hal, Hübner Adolf, and Eckehart Köhler. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1978. pp. 75-77

"Some formal properties of objectives," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 8: 16-20 (1979).
"The objectives of propositions as defined in an earlier paper are shown here to form a distributive lattice."

A Wittgensteinian semantics for propositions. In Intention and intentionality. Essay in honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Edited by Diamond Cora and Teichman Jenny. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1979. pp. 165-178
"More than once Professor Anscombe has expressed doubt concerning the semantic efficacy of the idea of an 'elementary proposition' as conceived in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself eventually discarded it, together with the whole philosophy of language of which it had been an essential part. None the less the idea is still with us, and it seems to cover theoretical potentialities yet to be explored. This paper is a tentative move in that direction.
According to Professor Anscombe, (*) Wittgenstein's 'elementary propositions' may be characterized by the following five theses:
(1) They are a class of mutually independent propositions.
(2) They are essentially positive.
(2) They are such that for each of them there are no two ways of being true or false, but only one.
(4) They are such that there is in them no distinction between an internal and an external negation.
(5) They are concatenations of names, which are absolutely simple signs.
We shall not investigate whether this is an adequate axiomatic for the notion under consideration. We suppose it is. In any case it is possible to modify it in one way or another, and for the resulting notion still to preserve a family resemblance with the original idea. One such modification is sketched out below."

"On the lattice of elementary situations," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 9: 115-121 (1980).

"On the verifiers of disjunction," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 9: 57-59 (1980).

"The Boolean algebra of objectives," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 10: 17-23 (1981).
"This concludes a series of papers constructing a semantics for propositional languages based on the notion of a possible "situation". Objectives of propositions are the situations described by them. The set of objectives is defined and shown to be a boolean algebra isomorphic to that formed by sets of possible worlds."

"A closure system for elementary situations," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 11: 134-139 (1982).

"On logical space," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 11: 84-88 (1982).

"Ludwig Fleck and Polish philosophy," Dialectics and Humanism 9: 25-28 (1982).

"A formal ontology of situations," Studia Logica 41: 381-413 (1982).
"A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal ones are possible worlds, constituting a logical space; minimal ones are logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference (or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown to form a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set algebra of loci is its representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary dimensions only."

Contents:
0. Preliminaries;
1. Elementary Situations
1.1.The Axioms; 1.2.Some Consequences; 1.3. W-Independence; 1.4.States of Affairs;
2. Sets of Elementary Situations
2.1.The Semigroup of SE"-Sets; 2.2.The Lattice of Minimal SE"-Sets; 2.3.Q-Spaces and V-Sets; 2.4.V-Equivalence and Q-Equivalence; 2.4.V-Classes and V-Sets;
3. Objectives of Propositions
3.1. Verifiers of Propositions; 3.2. Verifying and Forcing; 3.3. Situations and Logical Loci; 3.4. Loci and Objectives of Compound Propositions 3.5. The Boolean Algebra of Situations;
4. References

"Truth arguments and independence," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 12: 21-28 (1983).

"Logical space and metaphysical systems," Studia Logica 42: 269-284 (1983).
"The paper applies the theory presented in "A formal ontology of situations" (Studia Logica, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations.
Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the "situation semantics" of Perry and Barwise is discussed."

"An algebra of subsets for join-semilatttices with unit," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 13: 21-24 (1984).

"A topology for logical space," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 13: 255-259 (1984).

"Suszko: a reminiscence," Studia Logica 43: 317-321 (1984).
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp.302-306

"Die Grundwerte einer wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassaung," Conceptus 19: 3-8 (1985).
"The scientific world-view is one of the fundamentals of our culture. It can be characterized in part by its specific system of values. A world-view is regarded as a scientific one if "truth" is one of its primary values, that is, as a value which is not a means, but an end in itself. Truth is served in particular by the two instrumental values of conceptual clarity and openness to critique. Their standing is (at present) low, for two reasons. (1) Unclear thinking not only promotes social idols; its consequences are also often difficult to see clearly and immediately. (2) In any case truth is of no interest (in a biological sense) to human beings; therefore, critique can at best be a socially tolerated activity. On the other hand, truth is not only a value, but also a force which in the long run cannot be held back; this fact gives some hope to adherents of the scientific world-view. "

"Discreteness of logical space," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 15: 132-136 (1986).

"Entailments and independence in join-semilattices," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 18: 2-5 (1989).
"The paper generalizes Wittgenstein's notion of independence. in a join-semilattice of elementary situations the atoms are the Sachverhalte, and maximal ideals are possible worlds. A subset of that semilattice is independent iff it is free of "ontic ties". This is shown to be equivalent to independence in von Neumann's sense."

"On atomic join-semilattices," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 18: 105-111 (1989).
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp. 307-312.

The essence of Logical Atomism: Hume and Wittgenstein. In Wittgenstein. Eine Neubewertung. Akten 14. Internationale Wittgenstein-Symposium. Vol. 1. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1990. pp. 106-111

"A question about join-semilattices," Bulletin of the Section of Logic: 108 (1990).

Concerning reism in Kotarbinski. In Kotarbinski: logic. semantics and ontology. Edited by Wolenski Jan. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990. pp. 199-204
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp.265-271

Elzenberg's logic of values. In Logic counts. Edited by Zarnecka-Bialy Ewa. Dordrecht: Kluwe 1990. pp. 63-70
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp. 286-292 (with the title: Elzenberg's axiology"

"1. Values are what our value-Judgements refer to, and the passing of Judgements is one of our vital activities, like sleeping and breathing. We constantly appraise things as good or bad, pretty or ugly, as noble or base, well-made or misshapen. No wonder that both the act of appraisal and that which it refers to - i.e. the real or spurious values - have been always the source of philosophical reflexion. In systematic form such reflexion is what we call axiology.
In Polish philosophy it was Henryk Elzenberg (1887-1967) who reflected upon matters of axiology most deeply and incisively.
(...)
3. Leibniz had said somewhere: "There are two mazes in which the human mind is most likely to get lost: one is the concept of continuity, the other is that of liberty". This admits of generalization: all concepts are mazes, viz mazes of logical relations between the propositions that involve them.
One such maze is the concept of 'value'. Possibly, it is even the same as one of the two mentioned by Leibniz, only entered - so to say - by another door. For it would be in full accord with Elzenberg's position - and with that of Kant too - to adopt the following characteristic: values are what controls the actions of free agents. Thus the concepts of value and of liberty should constitute one conceptual maze, or - which comes to the same - two mazes communicating with each other.
To get a survey of such logical maze the first thing is to fix the ontological category of the concept in question. Thus, in our case, we ask what kind of entities are those 'values' supposed to be. (Ontological categories are the most general classes of entities, the summa genera A term even more general has to cover literally everything: like 'entity' or 'something'. For everything is an entity, just as everything is a something.)
Different ontologies admit different sets of categories. The categories most frequently referred to are those of 'objects', 'properties', and 'relations'; the more exotic ones are those of an 'event', a 'set', a 'function', or a 'situation'. One point, however, is of paramount importance: the categories admitted In one ontology have to be mutually disjoint". p. 63; 66.

"A sequel to Hawranek/Zygmunt," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 20: 143-144 (1991).

Needs and value. In Logic and ethics. Edited by Geach Peter. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991. pp.

On the discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In Peter Geach: philosophical encounters. Edited by Lewis Harry. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991. pp. 77-81
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp. 13-17.

"A question of logic in the philosophy of religion," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 22: 33-36 (1993).

On the synthetic a priori. In Philosophical logic in Poland. Edited by Wolenski Jan. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994. pp. 327-336

Logic and metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein's ontology of facts. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne 1999.
Contents: Preface 11; Discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy 13; 1. Elementary situations as a lattice of finite length 19; Elementary situations as a semilattice 73; 3. Independence 127; 4. Elementary situations generalized 137; 5. Auxiliary studies 193; 5.1 The Logical Atomisms of Russell and Wittgenstein 193; 5.2 A parallelism between Wittgenstein and Aristotle 198; 5.3 Frege's semantics 207; 5.4. The notion of fact as a modal operator 218; 5.5 "Tractatus" 5.541 - 5.542 224; 5.6 History of the concept of a Situation 229; 6. Offshoots 243 6.1 Languages and codes 243; 6.2 Logic and hermeneutics 254; 6.3 Kotarbinski's Reism 265; 6.4 On Bayle's critique of theodicy 271; 6.5 Elzenberg's axiology 286; 6.6 Needs and values 293; 6.7 Suszko: a reminiscence 302; Supplements 307; Indices: Index of subjects 317; Index of names 326; Index of Tractatus references 329.

"Atoms in semantic frames," Logica Trianguli 4: 69-86 (2000).
"Elaborating on Wittgenstein's ontology of facts, semantic frames are described axiomatically as based on the notion of an elementary situation being the verifier of a proposition. Conditions are investigated then for suchframes to be atomic, i.e. to have lattice-theoretic counterparts of his "Sachverhalte"."

"Extending atomistic frames," Logica Trianguli 5 (2001).

Tractatus 5.541 - 5.542. In Satz un Sachverhalt. Edited by Neumaier Otto. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2001. pp. 185-190
"In Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", thesis 5 is the Principle of Extensionality: all propositions are truth-functions of their clauses. This, however, has been often thrown into doubt. There are - it is said - compound propositions whose truth-value does not depend on that of their clauses. The usual example given are the so-called intensional contexts, like "John thinks that p", or "John says that p". And indeed, the truth-value of "p" is patently immaterial here to that of the whole proposition which it is part of.
Wittgenstein's retort are the following much discussed theses, adduced here in a translation of our own:

5.54 In the general propositional form, propositions occur in one another only as bases of truth-operations.
5.541 At first sight it seems that a proposition might occur in another also in a different way.
Particularly in certain propositional forms of psychology, like "A believes that p is the case", "A thinks p", etc.
For taken superficially, proposition p seems here to stand to the object A in some sort of relation.
(And in modem epistemology - Russell, Moore, etc. - these have actually been construed that way.)
5.542 However, "A believes that p", "A thinks p", "A says p" are clearly of the form " 'p' says p "; and this is not correlating a fact with an object, but a correlation of facts by correlating their objects.

The objection is met here in two steps. Firstly, it is pointed out that a proposition of the form "John says that p" is actually of the form "'p' says that p". The idea is this: the proposition "John says that Jill has a cat" means: John produces the sentence "Jill has a cat", the latter saying by itself that Jill has a cat. In such a way propositions get independent of the persons producing them, and communicate some objective content. It is surely not by John's looks that we come to know about Jill's cat, but merely by his words. Whom they stem from, is irrelevant.
In his second step Wittgenstein follows Frege's interpretation of indirect speech, but with modifications. He points out that the formula " 'p' says that p " is equivalent to some compound proposition in which neither the proposition "p" as a syntactic unit, nor anything equivalent to it, does occur although there occur all the logically relevant constituents of "p" separately.
(...)
The distinction between abstract and concrete states of affairs is not drawn explicitly in the "Tractatus". But it fits well thesis 5.156, if we expand that thesis by a few words of comment, added here in brackets:

5.156(d) A proposition may well be en incomplete image of a particular (concrete) situation, but it is always the complete image (of an abstract one).

The circumstance that in 5.156 not "states of affairs", but "situations" are mentioned, is of no consequence in our context. We assume that states of affairs are just atomic situations, and so the distinction between "concrete" and "abstract" applies to both."

"Extending atomistic frames: part II," Logica Trianguli 6: 69-88 (2003).
"The paper concludes an earlier one (Logica Trianguli, 5) on extensions of atomistic semantic frames. Three kinds of extension are considered: the adjunctive, the conjunctive, and the disjunctive one. Some theorems are proved on extending "Humean" frames, i.e. such that the elementary situations constituting their universa are separated by the maximally coherent sets of them ("realizations")."

"On a minimality condition," Bulletin of the Section of Logic 34: 227-228 (2005).